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REGULATION AND INVESTORS' TRUST IN THE
SECURITIES MARKETS*
Tamar Frankel'
The subject of investor confidence in the securities
markets has received wide attention recently as details of fraud
and avarice continue to emerge. Investors' trust in the
securities markets is important for the reasons discussed in
Professor Stout's marvelous paper.1 This Comment focuses on
the relationship between investors' trust and government
regulation of the markets. By regulation I mean congressional
legislation and actions by federal agencies. I exclude the courts
mainly because their lawmaking is not primarily policy-based,
and my aim is to sound the alarm for legislative and regulatory
policy-directed actions. Many an economist and academic have
argued that regulation is costly for issuers and financial
intermediaries.2 Regulation, they say, is a barrier to capital
formation, that is, to inducing savers to part with their money
and invest in securities.3 I assume that they are correct.
Regulation does impose these costs, and the costs can be a
barrier to raising capital for issuers.
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, See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why
Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345-46 (1999)
(explaining types of costs issuers incur from information disclosure); Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of
Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 934 (1998) ("For issuers, investors, and
financial intermediaries, learning the regulations of a particular regime is costly.").
3 See, e.g., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE CAPITAL FORMATION AND REGULATORY PROCESSES, Final Report, app. A (July
24, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform/capffull.txt (last visited
Sept. 23, 2002) (noting that capital formation was hampered by the costs of the
registration process).
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But here is a puzzle. When market prices rise, one
would assume that regulation can be stricter, because issuers
can easily raise capital and bear regulatory costs. Yet, the
opposite occurs. This is precisely when government regulation
relaxes. When market prices fall, when investors avoid the
markets, and issuers find it very difficult to raise capital, one
would assume that regulation would be more relaxed to reduce
the issuers' costs. Yet, the opposite occurs. This is precisely
when government regulation becomes stricter. This is a puzzle.
There is much evidence that the government tightens
regulation following market crashes and relaxes regulation as
market prices rise. In the 1930s, there was no market to speak
of, and the existing financial infrastructure did not work.
Investors were gone.4 Yet, during those years, Congress passed
regulation that was unheard of in strictness and intrusion, as
compared to existing state regulation that governed the field
until then.5 In 1970, after the market deflated from the bubble
of the 1960s, Congress again amended the laws by tightening
regulation,6 and in 1975 Congress restructured the markets at
a higher cost to the financial system.7 Similarly, after the 1987
4 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 683 (noting that Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts to promote investor
confidence and thus encourage investment).
' Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb (2000)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, 53
Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77zzz (2000)); Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, §§ 1-33, 49 Stat. 803, 803-38 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79z-6 (2000)).
' Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat.
1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (2000)); Charity Scott, A Broker-
Dealer's Civil Liability to Investors for Fraud: An Implied Private Right of Action Under
Section 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 IND. L.J. 687, 738-39 (1988).
7 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Walter Werner, The SEC as a
Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755 (1984) (describing the changes in market
regulation under the 1975 legislation); Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 562-63 (2000) (noting that "[in the early
1980s, when deregulation was in vogue, SEC staffing suffered. Unfortunately, the
securities markets were just beginning an era of expansive growth. The SEC found
itself seriously underfunded. The Reagan Administration's emphasis on deregulation,
backed by incomplete scholarly exposes on the problems plaguing regulatory agencies,
thus left financial markets woefully underpoliced at a critical time. Frauds of
unprecedented magnitude resulted .... Prudential-Bache Securities fraudulently sold
to thousands of retirees and other conservative investors, involving a web of scandal-
ridden limited partnerships. Vast networks of nefarious insider trading festered in the
darkness of deregulation. Though the costs of this debacle are difficult to calculate, the
carnage in terms of real lives ruined is astounding." (footnotes omitted)).
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crash, there was a flurry of activity by Congress and state
legislatures.8
Today, some commentators bemoan what they consider
to be excessive congressional regulation, especially from the
1930s. These commentators try to show that this body of
regulation was wrong and costly.9 Yet, in the 1930s or any
other period of regulatory activism, few argued against
regulation. In fact, issuers and intermediaries sought
government regulation. What is interesting is how they sought
regulation. On the one hand they clamored for it, and on the
other they argued for watering down and restricting the impact
of every regulatory provision, fighting all the way to
congressional approval."
This pattern has continued. In 1996, Congress divided
regulatory authority over approximately 22,000 investment
advisers, leaving the exclusive regulation of large advisers with
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the
exclusive regulation of numerous small advisers with the
states." The limited resources of the SEC were the main reason
for this division. These limited resources would have covered
the cost of examining each adviser about once every forty
years.' 2 The reaction of the small advisers is interesting and
8 See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash
of 1987-The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993 (1988)
(discussing the crash and proposals that followed it); Jonathan R. Macey et al.,
Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of the
October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 822-23 (1989) ("Certain
trading strategies, such as index arbitrage and portfolio insurance-commonly called
program trading-have fallen under intense criticism since the October 19, 1987
market crash. . . . Calls for restrictions on program trading strategies and the
derivative products that make them possible abound in Congress and the popular
press .... [and] extend to the uptick rule because the uptick rule plays an important
role in one type of program trading-index arbitrage." (footnotes omitted)).
See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Love and Money: An Affinity-Based Model
for the Regulation of Capital Formation by Small Businesses, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 259, 266-67 (1998) (noting that the mandatory disclosure provisions of the 1933
Act "[have] spawned substantial critical commentary").
'0 See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R. 10065
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th
Cong. 71-93 (1940) (statements of industry representatives supporting Investment
Company Act of 1940); Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S.
3580 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency (pt. 2), 76th Cong.
325-486 (1940) (statements of industry representatives expressing concerns about
specific provisions of the Act).
" National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
290, §§ 301-308, 110 Stat. 3416, 3436-40 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15, 29 U.S.C.); S. REP. No. 104-293, at 3 (1996) (noting number of SEC-regulated
advisers before amendment).
" S. REP. No. 104-293, at 3.
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revealing. They vehemently opposed the change." They wanted
to continue to advertise themselves as "Regulated by the SEC,"
which they valued more than the advertising of "Regulated by
State X." 4 Perhaps they were also concerned that state
examiners would be visiting them more often than once every
forty years.
I submit to you that the behavior of regulated financial
institutions makes sense. They benefit from regulation. One
benefit of regulation is reduced destructive competition. But
that is not the main benefit. Regulation offers issuers and
institutions government support in their efforts to gain
investors' trust in the financial markets. Just as it is difficult to
validate the trustworthiness of these institutions, it is also very
costly for the institutions to convince investors of their
trustworthiness. Regulation reduces the institutions' costs.
Regulation also helps to restrain the "bad apples" that may
ruin confidence in the industry; a few untrustworthy members
may spoil the reputation for trustworthiness for all industry
members. Regulation provides the industry with the stamp of
"good housekeeping." It implies that the government guards
investors' interests, and reduces the very high costs that
investors would otherwise bear in monitoring the issuers and
the institutions.
Matthew Fink, president of the Investment Company
Institute (the trade association of mutual funds' advisers),
recently stated that "the lack of panic exhibited by fund
investors [after the recent crash] is a direct result of their
confidence in the industry's commitment to investor protection
through regulation and self-policing."" It remains to be seen
whether his comfort will continue after the recent revelations
and scandals. As for Congress, it makes sense for legislators to
act when the market crashes. A market crash draws national
attention. That is when regulators feel compelled to show their
voters/investors that they care, and are committed to "do
something" about investors' losses.
13 This statement is based on my observations when I was an Attorney
Fellow at the Securities and Exchange Commission during the legislative changes, in
1996-1997.
14 SEC Oversight of Investment Advisers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 119 (1992)
(statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC).is Welcoming Remarks, INVESTMENT COMPANIES & INVESTMENT MANAGERS
(Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2002, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.sidley.com/db30/Cgi-bin/pubs/JPG-72.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2002).
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But why do congressional leaders believe that holding
public hearings and tightening regulation signals their investor
constituencies that Congress is "doing something"? Legislators
must believe that stricter laws are meaningful to the investors
and will restore their trust in the market system. Otherwise
legislators-the investors' representatives-would not engage
in passing such laws.
It is hard to separate investors' waning trust from
investors' disappointment and frustration at their losses and
from other reasons that may induce them to sell their shares
and cease investing in the markets. But I rely on the judgment
of the financial institutions and Congress. In their different
spheres, each is closest to investors. It is their judgment and
their actions that I cite as evidence for the proposition that
investors' trust is crucial to the existence of financial markets,
especially when prices fall, and that regulation can revive this
trust. Theoreticians may reason to the contrary. I put my trust
in the judgment of Congress and the financial institutions.
But why is regulation less meaningful to investors
during rising markets and more meaningful during, or
immediately after, a crash? Here I offer a speculation of my
own: prices for investors are surrogates for the integrity of the
market. Prices are efficient indicators. People tend to rely on
clear, specific signals rather than on probabilities." This may
be one of the reasons for the momentum of runs or bubbles that
cause sharp price rises and declines. When prices rise,
investors believe, rationally or irrationally, that the system is
fair to them and that it works well.' But when the market
crashes and investors lose significant amounts of money, they
begin to seek explanations for these losses. Even investors who
blame themselves for their bad judgment cannot avoid a
suspicion that something wrong in the system caused the
crash. Losing investors suspect that the system allowed
1s See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) (suggesting that the utility
theory is inconsistent with actual choice under risk which people make: "[Pleople
underweigh outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with others that are
obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk
aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure
losses.").
17 I hypothesize that investors care about the integrity of the market system.
They care about a fair, not necessarily a level, playing field. They are not willing to
play with loaded dice. They are willing to lose fair and square but not to be taken by
fraud. Investors also hope to gain both from the rise in the fortunes of the American
economy and from their good judgment about issuers.
20021
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someone to gain at their expense. They begin to question the
integrity of the system, and their trust falters.
In orderly markets, some investors believe that it is a
good time to sell and others believe that it is a good time to
buy. A run on the markets may be propelled, among other
things, by the belief of many investors that it is a good time to
sell and not a good time to buy. One reason for mass selling is
an uneasy feeling that the system is unfair to investors. This
belief may continue after the avalanche, and few investors will
buy until the pains of the crash and losses have faded from
recent memory.
Financial institutions and regulators respond to the
weakening trust in the markets by assuring investors that
their suspicions are unfounded. One can analogize the
trustworthiness of the system to reputation. To reap future
benefits from the financial markets, financial institutions and
Congress invest in building up the markets' reputation for
trustworthiness. But when times are good, Congress and the
industry overconsume the fruit of a good reputation and
deplete its value. When events lead investors to question the
system's trustworthiness, Congress, the issuers and the
industry start to repair the damage and invest in market
reputation again. When investors' trust is restored, industry
pressures increase to reduce the cost of capital formation.
Investors do not seem to mind. Regulation is relaxed. And
when prices fall, the cycles start all over again.
Congress, the issuers and the industry should learn
what private sector corporations know so well in the context of
their businesses. Deplete your reputation with shoddy goods
and you are bound for lean years of meager profits and high
investment to shore up your reputation. The benefits from the
depletion may or may not be worth it. Congress, the issuers
and the industry knew this lesson after tightening regulation
in the 1930s and 1970s. But as leaders of these institutions
came and went, institutional memories seem to have dimmed.
This leads to my second observation and another series of
questions.
As Professor Stout well documented, securities
regulation today is more lax than the regulation in the 1930s or
even the 1970s.18 For the past thirty years, notwithstanding
periodic runs on the securities markets, Congress has been
'8 Stout, supra note 1 at 432-36.
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relaxing regulation. Yet, the flight of investors from the
markets has not been as stark as in the 1930s. Has the market
system become fairer? Perhaps. Has corporate management
become less greedy? Maybe. Have financial institutions become
more trustworthy? Could be. Have investors developed a habit
of trusting the markets? Possibly. But there are two more
explanations that I offer.
I call the first explanation the "golden handcuffs." Since
the mid-1970s, the United States government has provided tax
deferrals to savers who invest in the securities markets. In
1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 9 required
employers to fund their pension fund obligations, and this
funding took the form of investments in securities. Then
employers passed the benefits and risks of investments to
employees. Employees also invest their savings in securities
and, often, in mutual funds. Self-employed savers have been
granted tax benefits. They, too, invest in the markets and with
mutual funds.2" The amounts of these investments are very
large. Some say about 35% of the market.2'
When the market crashes, these investors are locked
into these tax deferral benefits. If they sell the securities and
withdraw the proceeds, they must pay the deferred taxes.
Further, any income from an investment they make with the
proceeds will be immediately taxable. Therefore, persons with a
life's savings in mutual funds would think more than twice
before withdrawing their money. In addition, the potential tax
rate on withdrawal may be higher than the rate they are
currently paying. Retirees in low tax brackets will fall into a
higher tax bracket on withdrawal of large sums in a short
period. Thus, many investors cannot leave the markets without
paying a heavy penalty-taxes for the past and perhaps giving
up future tax benefits.
My second explanation is that many investors do leave
the markets, but not ostentatiously. In the past, they fled the
equities markets by selling their securities and depositing the
money in the banks. Today, they flee the equity funds to the
money market funds. These funds invest not in equities or
19 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
20 See I.R.C. §§ 403(b), 401(k) (2000).
21 Mutual Funds and the Retirement Market in 2000, FUNDAMENTALS (Inv.
Co. Inst., Washington, D.C.), June 2001, at 1, 2, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-
vlOn2.pdf (last visited May 30, 2002).
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corporate bonds, but in bank and government securities. This
money feeds bank loans. Bank loans feed borrowers, by debt.
Bank lending is usually more conservative. Some of the debt is
securitized but reaches a different market, one populated
mainly by financial institutions. Bank purchases may be more
conservative, because bankers do the due diligence, not the
accountants, lawyers and underwriters. Thus, the trend is
away from corporate securities and especially from equities,
and away from market "due diligence," to bank "due diligence."
The transfer of investments from equity funds to money
market funds assures mutual fund advisers and other money
managers a continued business, if not as managers of equity
funds, then as managers of money market funds, although that
business may not be so profitable. Today, the move from
equities to bank obligations and back is more efficient-it takes
one phone call to move the money from one fund to another.
Some long-term investors leave some investments in equities.
Therefore, it is not so clear that investors are leaving the
markets. The integrity of the system seems to remain intact
even after a crash.
The result of this scenario is that today, regulators do
not react to falling prices with the same alertness, alacrity and
concern with which they reacted in the past. They need a jolt of
more direct evidence to demonstrate cracks in the trust
foundation, such as scandalous frauds perpetrated by the
leaders of the issuers and shocking discoveries of avarice of the
market gatekeepers-the accountants, lawyers and investment
bankers. Most importantly, legislators need to be jarred by
truly outraged investors. It is a pity they wait so long.
I agree with Professor Stout that it is a mistake to
assume a solid investor trust in the markets today.2 The
signals of failed trust are loud and clear. They are simply
delivered in a new form. But then, why worry? Even if
investors' losses are significant and the scandals are
sufficiently shocking, and even if investors scream in
frustration, all that will happen is that market prices will fall
and the capital formation for unreliable issuers will rise. That
will teach issuers to be trustworthy. Market discipline will take
over and perhaps do a better job.
Unfortunately, the markets, that is investors, do not
necessarily provide the discipline. Investors seek to reduce
22 Stout, supra note 1, at, 436-37.
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their monitoring costs. They can follow each other's actions or
some analysts' recommendations, and at the end, they can
leave the markets altogether, a "run." These may be irrational
behavior patterns, but these patterns have occurred for
decades. The danger is that even if investors do not withdraw
their money from the securities markets they will cease to
continue investing in securities. The mutual fund industry
seems to sense this danger because it is looking for new
markets abroad.23 The competition among the mutual fund
advisers is becoming fiercer.24 I trust the industry's judgment.
Another ambiguous signal of investor confidence is
demonstrated by activity in other markets. Even as the prices
of securities continue to fall, real estate markets seem to hold
and even to rise. Additionally, the price of gold has climbed. I
wonder whether the savings that used to head for the securities
markets are not diverted to real estate, gold and other
alternative investments.
If investors' trust wanes, and if their distrust deepens
for some time, it may take more than strict government
regulation to bring them back. That something may be a
change in our current culture. Today's culture covers up theft.
Managers of public companies, trustees, money managers and
pillars of society are not faulted for using other people's money
as their own. Those who get away with it are viewed enviously
as smart. If investors are hurt sufficiently hard and long, they
may cease to envy their disloyal managers and advisers, and
instead turn their backs to them, and treat them as outcasts,
worse than common thieves.
Therefore, if we want investors to remain in the
markets, the attitude of those who control other people's money
must change. Money managers must shift their attitudes to
simple honesty. The markets, whatever they are, and the
investors themselves will not effect the change. I fear that
those who expect investors to distinguish between honest and
dishonest managers are in for a bitter disappointment. While
the burden is shifting to the investors to protect themselves,
and caveat emptor is not far behind, investors may indeed
23 See Global Development, Investment Company Institute, at http://www.ici.-
org/newsroom/industry-issues.global.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2002) (listing items of
Investment Company Institute's "international agenda" which would facilitate sale of
U.S. funds in foreign countries).
2 See Tom Lauricella, Fee Bitten: American Express Targets Outsider, WALL
ST. J., June 7, 2002, at C1.
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protect themselves, but not in the way the issuers and industry
expect.
I doubt whether investors will commit their valuable
attention and time to judge the difference between honest and
dishonest corporate management and financial intermediaries.
I doubt whether investors will rely on advisers to make the
distinction, once investors lose their trust in the market
intermediaries. From the investors' point of view, it is more
efficient to withdraw their savings from the markets. Unless
we quickly develop a culture of honesty, and persuade investors
that their mistrust is unjustified, I believe investors will judge
all to be dishonest, including the issuers' management,
financial intermediaries, investment advisers, brokers,
underwriters and trustees.
When investors' trust is lost, efficient markets will
shrink and become less liquid, and the cost of capital will rise.
Other less efficient, but more trustworthy, forms of
intermediation are likely to take over. Or investors will return
to other types of investments, like real estate, gold and the like.
They will seek investments they can see, evaluate and guard
for themselves. As investors learn self-reliance, as costly as
that might be, and have no need to trust, as efficient as that
might be, they will leave the markets behind them, to the
detriment of us all.
[Vol. 68: 2
